We investigate the relative roles of US economic policy uncertainty and global risk aversion in contributing to financial and macroeconomic fluctuations in small open economies (SOEs) using a panel of forty SOEs that includes both advanced economies (AEs) and emerging markets economies (EMEs). We find that SOEs' financial and real economic activities respond smoothly and persistently to US policy uncertainty shocks, consistent with Bloom et al. (2018), while exhibiting relatively short-lived and robust reactions to US risk aversion shocks. A novel finding of this paper is that the responses of AEs and EMEs are asymmetric: AEs react more strongly to US policy uncertainty shocks while EMEs are more sensitive to risk aversion shocks. These results suggest that the channels through which each shock is transmitted to SOEs may vary.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in major advanced economies has escalated since the US presidential election and Brexit in 2016. For example, EPU in the US concerns international trade, political and strategic relations with other countries (NATO, China, etc.) , the future of financial regulations, and the fiscal and monetary policy stances under the Trump administration. Baker et al. (2016) and other recent studies show that such EPU shocks can be an important driver of business cycle fluctuations in the US. Beyond this domestic impact, policy-makers and researchers in other countries, especially small open economies (SOEs), have been concerned about the financial and macroeconomic spillovers of heightened EPU emanating from major economies since the dynamics of uncertainty in SOEs tend to be largely influenced by uncertainty shocks with a foreign origin as illustrated in Bloom (2017) . 1) In addition to such direct uncertainty spillover, US EPU shocks can be transmitted to SOEs through trade and financial channels.
In this paper, we investigate the spillovers of EPU shocks originating in the US, which is the largest economy in the world, to financial and macroeconomic fluctuations in SOEs. Apart from interest in the spillovers of US EPU per se, SOEs might be better subjects than large countries for studying the causal impacts of uncertainty shocks since the uncertainty shocks in large countries are exogenous, orthogonal to the fluctuations in the SOEs. We explore the relative importance for SOEs of US EPU shocks and global risk aversion (or risk appetite) shocks, which have been identified as the key external factors driving financial and macroeconomic fluctuations in SOEs. A hike in US risk aversion can be transmitted to financial markets in SOEs by modifying global investors' risk-taking and thereby affecting capital inflows into SOEs (e.g. flight to safety). At the 1) Klößer and Sekkel (2014) , using the Baker-Bloom-Davis (2016) index of policy uncertainty for six advanced economies, investigate how policy uncertainty in one country influences uncertainty in other countries. They found that EPU shocks originating in the US and UK significantly influence the dynamics of uncertainty in other countries.
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same time, it also pushes up the country spreads facing SOEs in the international financial markets and thus adversely affects their real economic activities (see, for example, Rey (2015) and Akinci (2013) ). Next, we compare the impacts of each shock on two different groups of SOEs:
advanced economies (AEs) and emerging markets economies (EMEs), considering that each shock might have a differential impact on each group due to, for example, the difference in the extents to which US EPU spills over to domestic EPU in each SOE type, or the differences in financial development and macroeconomic fundamentals between AEs and EMEs.
To this end, we estimate a quarterly panel VAR model using a dataset of forty SOEs, including 13 AEs and 27 EMEs, for the period 1990:Q1 to 2015:Q4. The model for estimation consists of two blocks-the US and SOE blocks-with the block exogeneity assumption that variables in the US block are exogenous to SOEs and thus cannot be affected by variables in the SOE block. 2) Both US EPU and global risk aversion measures are included in the same model, not only to jointly investigate the relative role of each shock but also to allow for the interaction between EPU and financial market conditions in the US. 3) Also, measures for the US business cycle and monetary policy stance are included in the US block to control for the endogenous responses of US EPU and US risk aversion to the state of the economy and changes in monetary policy. 4) With these four variables in the US block, the identification of exogenous variations in US EPU and global risk aversion is based on a recursive assumption 2) Such assumption has been widely used to study the impacts of external shocks on SOEs (see, for example, Cushman and Zha, 1997; Mackowiak, 2007) . 3) Policy uncertainty increases risk premiums in financial markets by affecting investor beliefs about which policy the government might adopt in the future and increasing uncertainty about the impact of the current policy on firm profitability Veronesi, 2012 and . At the same time, higher policy uncertainty worsens the asymmetric information problem in financial markets, which may lead to a decrease in risk appetite and deterioration in financial market conditions. 4) Uncertainty in general rises in recessions (Bloom, 2014; Bloom et al., 2018) and risk aversion, which is the price of risk, also tends to be counter-cyclical (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) . Monetary policy might also affect the variations in uncertainty and risk appetite. When interest rates are low, the appetite to take on risk tends to be high with uncertainty low (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Borio and Zhu, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2013) .
following the related literature such as Bekaert et al. (2013) and Popescu and Smets (2010) , who study the relative roles of uncertainty shocks and financial shocks in German macroeconomic fluctuations. That is, in our baseline specification, the business cycle variable is ordered first, and the monetary policy variable is ordered second, followed by the EPU and risk aversion proxies. In the robustness checks, we consider an alternative ordering of the variables and find that our results are quite robust both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the SOE block, we include SOE variables related to capital flows, and real and financial market activities, considering the possible transmission channels of each shock to SOEs and data availability.
For a measure of US EPU, we employ the EPU index for the US constructed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) . For an indicator of risk aversion, the US VIX index, which measures the option-implied expected volatility of the S&P 500 index over the following 30 days, has been widely used in financial markets and related literature. However, it also reflects financial market uncertainty and thereby might share a common uncertainty component with US EPU. To address this issue, we consider the risk-aversion index proposed by Bekaert et al. (2013) as our baseline measure of risk aversion while using the VIX index for robustness checks. 5) We have three main findings. First, both the US EPU and US risk aversion shocks have contractionary effects on real economic activity in SOEs, and also trigger capital outflows from SOEs, thereby exerting downward pressures on financial market variables such as equities prices and exchange rates. 6) Second, global risk aversion shocks have stronger negative effects on both financial markets and real economic activities than do US EPU shocks in terms of impulse response and forecast error 5) Bekaert et al. (2013) decompose the VIX index into two components: the expected stock market volatilitythat is, stock market uncertainty-and a component containing information about risk aversion, and propose the latter as the novel risk aversion index. 6) US EPU shocks have a negligible impact on SOEs' exchange rates and inflation, while US risk aversion shocks lead to a significant currency depreciations and inflation declines in SOEs.
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variance decomposition analyses. However, each shock exerts a qualitatively different impact on SOEs: the global risk aversion shock has more sharp and short-lived impacts both on financial markets and real economic activity, while the US EPU shock has smoother and more persistent impacts. That is, after a risk aversion shock, the sharp initial declines both in financial and macroeconomic activities are followed by a quick rebound and temporary overshoots within one year due to pent-up demand, while the gradual declines after a US EPU shock are followed by a sluggish recovery. These responses of SOEs to the external uncertainty shock resemble those that show up in Bloom et al. (2018) , who showed that, in a general equilibrium framework, an uncertainty shock is followed by smoother and more persistent output responses along with a slower rebound compared to those shown as in Bloom (2009 model to investigate the spillover impacts of an uncertainty shock 8) There exists a large body of literature on the channels through which uncertainty in general has macroeconomic impacts on the domestic economy. It has emphasized real option effects (Bernanke, 1993; Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012) , financial channels (Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2016) , the feedback channel (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006; Fajgelbaum et al., 2014) , the precautionary savings channel (Basu and Bundick, 2012; Leduc and Liu, 2012; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011) , etc. For more details, refer to Bloom (2014 originating in the US on several major economies and New Zealand.
They argue that the confidence channel plays a larger role than the trade channel in transmitting the uncertainty shock to SOEs such as New Zealand. To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of the first papers to explore the spillovers of EPU shocks originating in the US to financial and real activities in SOEs using a large panel of SOEs that includes both AEs and EMEs, and the first to investigate the relative role of US EPU shocks in comparison with global risk aversion shocks.
Second, our work also relates to the large body of literature on the impacts of fluctuations in global financial conditions-in particular due to changes in global risk aversion-on capital flows to SOEs and SOEs' financial markets and real economic activities. Many studies have documented that changes in international investors' risk appetite play a key role in driving capital flows to EMEs (see, for instances, Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012; Rey, 2015) . In addition, changes in global risk aversion have been shown to be an important driver of EME asset prices, including sovereign bond yields, equity prices, country spreads and exchange rates (for recent contributions, see Ananchotikul and Zhang, 2014; Ebeke and Lu, 2015; Yildirim, 2016) . Bruno and Shin (2015) showed that US monetary policy shocks can be transmitted internationally to SOEs via the risk-taking channel through the banking sector. That is, changes in US monetary policy affect the willingness of international banks to take on risk, which in turn impacts cross-border banking capital flows to SOEs and SOE exchange rates. 
Ⅲ. Identification and Estimation
In this section, we explain our empirical framework. Subsection III-1 elaborates on the data and measurements. Subsection III-2 gives a detailed description of our econometric model and identification strategy.
Data and measurement
The data set employed in our estimation is an unbalanced panel of In our baseline estimation, we have four variables in the US block. US 9) We exclude from the sample the countries with the six highest GDPs as per IMF WEO (2016) : the United States, China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, to be in line with the "small open economy" assumption as in Towbin and Weber (2011 The US EPU index(   ), which was constructed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) , is used as a proxy for US economic policy-related uncertainty. As our measurement of global risk aversion, we use the risk-aversion index constructed by Bekaert et al. (2013) and Hahn et al. (2017) in which they decompose the VIX index into two components:
expected stock market volatility-that is, stock market uncertainty-and a component containing information about risk aversion, and propose the latter as a novel risk aversion index. 12) For robustness checks, we also use the VIX index as an alternative measure for global risk aversion.
10) We use a "shadow federal funds rate" in measuring the rate as an indicator of the monetary policy stance for the zero lower bound period from 2008 to 2015 (Wu and Xia, 2016) . 11) GDP are seasonally adjusted using X-13 ARIMA. 12) We thank Jahoon Hahn for sharing his data on risk aversion and uncertainty. We consider the following panel VAR model with block exogeneity:
where  The variables in the US block are followed by those in the SOE block. More specifically, 13) They order the risk aversion variable last after the uncertainty variable on the ground that the financial market risk index incorporates both macroeconomic news and shifts in agents' perceptions about the uncertainty. 14) For other identification schemes intended to disentangle uncertainty and financial risk shocks, see Christiano et al. (2014) We then select two quarters for the optimal lags of the endogenous variables on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. We also draw 90 percent confidence bands through the bootstrapping approach around the point estimates after 1,000 replications.
Ⅳ. Results
In this section, we present impulse response functions on spillover of US EPU shocks to EMEs. We then implement additional estimations for robustness checks. Overall, the estimation result shows that the spillovers from a positive risk aversion shock are characterized by strong, sharp and short-lived drops in financial and real activities. When it comes to the responses of the external variables to a rise in US risk aversion, the growth rate in the US drops temporarily over two or three quarters. It is also found that heightened risk aversion leads to a decrease in the federal funds rate lasting for more than three years. This result is basically in line with the finding by Bekaert et al. (2013) that the heightened uncertainty or risk aversion will, more likely, lead to accommodative monetary policy in the near-term future.
Baseline Estimation
Concerning the spillover to the SOEs of the heightened risk aversion, risk aversion shocks generate sharp and short-lived drops and subsequent rebounds in output growth. More specifically, the increase in risk aversion is found to lower output growth by about 0.03%p during the first three quarters, but with a rapid recovery starting from the fourth quarter. 15) This sharp decline in output appears due to the fact that heightened fear leads firms and households to temporarily stop investing and purchasing durable goods. However, pent-up demand leads to a sharp rebound, once the prevailing fear in the market starts to wane. In particular, this result suggests that SOEs may be more severely affected by the spike in risk aversion than the US itself in terms of the magnitude of the slowdown in output growth. EPU leads to a slowdown in output growth in SOEs, which is however relatively moderate and small in magnitude although statistically significant as well. Interestingly, the positive policy uncertainty shock has relatively persistent and prolonged impacts on SOEs' real activities, while the risk aversion shock has sharp and short-lived impacts on it. In addition, unlike the responses to the risk aversion shock, the responses to the policy uncertainty shock do not display any pent-up demand. Most importantly, a key difference between the risk aversion and policy uncertainty shocks is that the shock due to risk aversion has much stronger, larger effects on SOEs' real activities than does the EPU shock. These results are a departure from Stockhammar and Österholm (2016) , who found that policy uncertainty matters more than financial market volatility by comparing their effects on GDP growth in SOEs. We note that this difference in the results may be attributed to the fact that Stockhammar and Österholm compared these effects without appropriately identifying the various types of shocks, due for example to risk aversion, financial uncertainty or policy uncertainty, but by simply estimating separate equations for them.
Moreover, in response to the heightened US policy uncertainty the exchange rates in SOEs are found to depreciate broadly, but the magnitudes are also much smaller than in the case of heightened risk aversion. The heightening of policy uncertainty is likely to trigger outflows of capital from SOEs, just as in the case of the risk aversion shock.
Nevertheless, a one standard deviation positive shock to policy uncertainty leads to a maximum 0.05 percentage point increase in capital outflows as a percentage of GDP, which is much smaller than the 0.15 percentage point increase in outflows in response to the risk aversion shock. In short,
an EPU shock in a large economy is likely to have persistent but trivial spillover effects to SOEs' real activities, along with mild, limited impacts on their exchange rates and capital flows.
16) This result stands in contrast with the finding in Bekaert et al. (2013) and Hahn et al. (2017) , that neither risk aversion nor uncertainty shocks have significant impacts on the Fed's monetary policy stance.
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to an Economic Policy Uncertainty Shock Table 2 reports the forecast error variance decomposition of the risk aversion and EPU shocks. The risk aversion shock explains approximately 5% of the forecast error variance of GDP growth after six quarters, and this then drops to 4% after 12 quarters. The EPU shock in contrast accounts for around 2% of the forecast error variance of GDP growth after six quarters, which rises to 3% after 12 quarters. We also find that the forecast error variance of GDP growth is explained more by the risk aversion shock than the EPU shock. In contrast, the forecast error variances of the capital flows and nominal effective exchange rate are more accounted for by the EPU shock after 12 quarters, although they are explained more by the risk aversion shock after six quarters. These results appear to be in line with the results shown in the impulse response analysis. 
Substituting GDP Components for GDP
We move on now to perform an additional estimation by replacing GDP with its key components, i.e. investment, private consumption and net exports. The investment and private consumption variables are expressed in log differences, and net exports as shares of GDP. The results obtained using these endogenous variables are basically in line with our benchmark results. For instance, the responses of investment and consumption to the risk aversion and policy uncertainty shocks are all consistent with those of output growth in our benchmark estimation. Specifically, investment and consumption exhibit short-lived but large-scale responses to the risk aversion shock, and protracted but relatively small-scale responses to the EPU shock. That being said, net exports do not respond to the policy uncertainty shock to any significant extent, while they increase significantly in response to the risk aversion shock. 
Which External Shock Matters in Small Open Economies? US Economic Policy Uncertainty vs. Global Risk Aversion 20

Robustness Checks
In this subsection we conduct some sensitivity analyses of our baseline estimation, to verify that its results are robust to ordering, identification, endogenous variables, etc.
Reversing the Variable Ordering
The ordering of the risk aversion and the EPU may indeed affect the identification of the model, and the results of the impulse response analysis thereby. The ordering in our baseline equation with the Cholesky decomposition assumes that the risk aversion may affect the policy uncertainty instantly, but that the reverse causality does not hold, following Bekaert et al. (2013) . We therefore test for the robustness of our model specification by changing the ordering between the risk aversion and the EPU. Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a one standard deviation US risk aversion shock with the risk aversion ordered after the EPU. We find that, overall, the responses are similar to those in the baseline estimation. That is, the domestic and spillover effects of an unanticipated surge in US risk aversion appear to be relatively drastic and short-lived.
The only difference compared to the baseline estimation is the Fed's monetary policy reaction in this case, of reducing the federal funds rate and steering it quickly toward its original level.
Moving on to the impulse responses to a US EPU shock, shown in Figure 6 , we find impulse responses highly similar to those observed in our benchmark model. Despite slight differences in the responses of some of them, most of the variables react to the EPU shock in manners and magnitudes quite similar to those in the benchmark estimation. 
VIX versus EPU
As is elaborately documented by Baker et al. (2016) , the EPU index differs from the VIX index conceptually in several respects. Most notably, as they emphasize, the EPU index reflects policy uncertainty, and not just about the financial market, while the VIX relates to volatility in equity returns. 18) We have already chosen to control for the financial risk aversion shocks by including the risk aversion index constructed by Baker et al.
18) In addition, they note that the EPU index specifies no explicit time horizon, while the VIX index is defined as the implied volatility over a 30-day look-ahead period. The VIX samples only publicly-traded firms, which account for approximately one-third of private employment (Davis et al. 2007 , Baker et al. 2016 Notes: Estimated structural impulse-response functions are graphed in red lines, and 90% bootstrapped 
Comparison of Responses between AEs and EMEs
To this point we have checked for the presence of spillover effects on SOEs due to changes in policy uncertainty and risk aversion. Our main finding in the previous subsection was that there is a significant difference in the responses to the risk aversion and the policy uncertainty shocks. In this subsection, in order to further examine the heterogeneity in the spillover effects of these shocks, we perform an additional analysis by splitting the sample into two groups: comprising advanced economies ("AEs" hereafter) and emerging market economies ("EMEs" hereafter). The given that many countries are substantially affected by changes in major economies' policy stances over the relatively longer term. In particular, policy-related uncertainties will have stronger spillover effects on a country that is more deeply integrated into the global economy and with the United States as well, from both the real and the financial perspectives, which may thus be more severely affected by it. In contrast, where fears in the financial market escalate, the negative impacts are likely to last for a relatively short time and be concentrated on financially vulnerable countries. For instance, it is often observed that spikes in financial distress in major economies have triggered massive reversals or sudden stops of capital flows, or "flights to quality" -where capital shifts from relatively risky financial assets in EMEs into safer assets such as US Treasuries.
Concerning the heterogeneity in the magnitudes and shapes of the responses to the uncertainty and risk aversion shocks, we find it necessary to further explore the backdrop behind this novel finding. 
Ⅴ. Conclusion
We attempt to address two intriguing questions -whether economic policy uncertainty in the United States and global risk aversion have significant
spillovers to small open economies, and which of them matters more. To do this, we arguably identify policy uncertainty and risk aversion shocks, and find using a panel of 40 small open economies that both of them are relevant drivers of the business cycles in these economies.
Specifically, both types of shocks -US policy uncertainty and risk aversion shocks -have negative spillovers to small open economies. More interestingly, we find that risk aversion shocks have much stronger and larger impacts on both financial and real activities than do policy uncertainty shocks. We find as well that risk aversion shocks have more sharp and short-lived impacts on real activity, while policy uncertainty shocks have more persistent and protracted impacts on it. Furthermore, splitting the estimation across country groups, we present evidence that advanced economies are more strongly affected by US policy uncertainty, while global risk aversion is more important to emerging economies. Our conjecture is that the former finding relates closely to the fact that AEs, which are more integrated into the global economy, may well be substantially affected by US economic policy going forward while being less responsive to temporary financial disturbances. The latter finding can in contrast be argued to owe to the fact that emerging economies can be more severely buffeted by the flight to safety motives of investors.
Our study provides some interesting implications concerning the measurement and identification of uncertainty. This paper's main departure from the previous related literature is its finding of notable heterogeneities in the responses of SOEs to an EPU shock, compared to a risk aversion shock, and in the responses to both types of shocks between AEs and EMEs, when the policy uncertainty and financial risk aversion shocks are appropriately identified.
Despite our discovery of these meaningful implications, there are some issues remaining to be topics for future research. Most importantly, we need to improve our understanding of the reasons for the significant heterogeneities in the magnitudes and persistencies of the spillovers depending on the type of country affected by the uncertainty shocks, and on whether the shocks are EPU or risk aversion shocks.
